作者简介：布拉马·切拉尼(Brahma Chellaney)，新德里印度智库政策研究中心(Center for Policy Research)战略研究教授，拥有国际军备控制博士学位，著有《亚洲主宰：中国、印度和日本的崛起》(Asian Juggernaut：The Rise of China, India, and Japan)、《水：亚洲的新战场》(Water: Asia’s New Battleground ) 、《水、和平和战争：应对全球水危机》(Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis)等著作。《水：亚洲的新战场》一书2012年获得总部位于美国纽约的亚洲协会(Asia Society)颁发的“伯纳德·施瓦茨图书奖”(Bernard Schwartz Book Award)，使布拉马·切拉尼成为第一位生活于英语文化圈外的该奖获得者。布拉马·切拉尼在欧美学术界、大众传媒界和印度政界的影响力都不容小觑。
布拉马·切拉尼作为国际安全和军备控制专家，在美国哈佛大学、布鲁金斯学会、约翰·霍普金斯大学国际高级研究院和澳大利亚国立大学兼职，是负责颁发诺贝尔和平奖的挪威诺贝尔研究所(Norwegian Nobel Institute)研究员。
布拉马·切拉尼还担任电视评论员和世界报业辛迪加(Project Syndicate)专栏作家。世界报业辛迪加汇聚了世界顶级经济学家和学者的思考精华、观点和评论，为读者带来来自全球的原创的发人深省的经济、政治、科学和文化评论。他为美国《国际先驱论坛报》(International Herald Tribune)、《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)、《日本时报》(The Japan Times)、 新加坡《海峡时报》(The Straits Times)、《印度时报》(The Times of India)、印度《经济时报》 (The Economic Times)和印度第二大财经报纸《铸币》( Mint)撰写评论文章。1985年获得美国海外新闻协会引用卓越奖(The Overseas Press Club of America's Citation for Excellence)。曾任印度国家安全委员会顾问至2000年1月，是印度国家安全咨询委员会外部安全小组(External Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board)召集人与核战略思想小组(Nuclear Doctrine Group)成员。
印度总理莫迪2015年5月16日结束访华，布拉马·切拉尼5月18日就在世界报业辛迪加网站发表《莫迪在中国》(Modi in China)一文，分析中印关系的战略现实。尼泊尔英文报纸《喜马拉雅时报》(Hymlayan Times)5月22日第8版以《莫迪访华：严酷的战略现实》(Modi’s China visit ：Harsh strategic realities)为题转发该文。
该文引发广泛关注，截至2015年5月23日该文已经被推特(Tweet)转发470人次，脸谱(Facebook)分享917次，领英(Linked in)分享64人次，谷歌书签(Goole Bookmarks )分享3人次。现将该文译为中文，供参考。——译者
河北经贸大学尼泊尔研究中心 张树彬 译
英语原文：
Modi in China
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/modi-china-visit-sino-indian-relationship-by-brahma-chellaney-2015-05
MAY 18, 2015
NEW DELHI – China and India have a fraught relationship, characterized by festering disputes, deep mistrust, and a shared ambivalence about political cooperation. Booming bilateral trade, far from helping to turn the page on old rifts, has been accompanied by increasing border incidents, military tensions, and geopolitical rivalry, as well as disagreements on riparian and maritime issues.
Since taking office last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought to transform his country’s relationship with China, arguing that Asia’s prospects hinge “in large measure” on what the two countries – which together account for one-third of the world’s population – “achieve individually” and “do together.” But, as Modi’s just-concluded tour of China highlighted, the issues that divide the demographic titans remain formidable.
To be sure, China’s leaders fêted Modi in style. When Modi arrived in Xian – one of China’s four ancient capitals and President Xi Jinping’s hometown – Xi took him on a personal tour of the Big Wild Goose Pagoda. (Modi subsequently boasted of his close “plus one” friendship with Xi.) In Beijing, Premier Li Keqiang posed for a selfie with Modi outside the Temple of Heaven.
What China’s leaders did not do was yield on any substantive issue – and not for lack of effort on Modi’s part. Despite Modi’s pragmatic and conciliatory tack, his request that China “reconsider its approach” on some of the issues that are preventing the partnership from realizing its “full potential” went unheeded.
Consider discussions relating to the ongoing dispute over the two countries’ long Himalayan frontier. Alluding to a series of Chinese military incursions since 2006, Modi declared that “a shadow of uncertainty” hangs over the border region, because the “line of actual control” that China unilaterally drew after defeating India in a 1962 war that it had initiated was never mutually clarified. Modi proposed resuming the LAC clarification process, but to no avail.
In fact, the reason for the continued ambiguity is that, in 2002, after more than two decades of negotiations, China reneged on a promise to exchange maps with India covering the two main disputed sectors – the Austria-size Arunachal Pradesh and the Switzerland-size Aksai Chin, along with its adjacent areas – located at either end of the Himalayas. Four years later, China revived its long-dormant claim to Arunachal Pradesh, and has since breached its border several times. It fulminated against Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in February.
Nonetheless, in his zeal to build the bilateral relationship, Modi announced that Chinese tourists are now eligible to receive electronic visas on arrival in India – blindsiding his foreign secretary, who had just told the media that no such decision had been made. China’s foreign minister hailed the measure as a “gift” – an accurate description, given that China has yielded nothing in return. On the contrary, China has aimed to undermine India’s sovereignty, by issuing stapled visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh.
Moreover, China – which, by annexing water-rich Tibet, has become the region’s hydro-hegemon – also declined to conclude an agreement to sell India hydrological data on transboundary rivers year-round, rather than just during the monsoon season. So China is not only refusing to create a water-sharing pact with any of its neighbors; it will not even share comprehensive data on upstream river flows.
Making matters worse, there is an unmistakable air of condescension in the pronouncements, contained in the joint statement issued at the end of Modi’s visit, that China “took note of India’s aspirations” to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and “understands and supports India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations, including in the Security Council.” China is the only major power that has not backed India’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.
Economic outcomes were similarly unequal. Many of the deals Modi made with business leaders in Shanghai – supposedly worth $22 billion – entail Chinese state-owned banks financing Indian firms to purchase Chinese equipment. This will worsen India’s already massive trade deficit with China, while doing little to boost China’s meager investment in India, which totals just 1% of China’s annual bilateral trade surplus – a surplus that has swelled by one-third since Modi took office and is now approaching $50 billion.
Indeed, China and India have one of the world’s most lopsided trade relationships. Chinese exports to India are worth five times more than its imports from India. Moreover, China mainly purchases raw materials from India, while selling it mostly value-added goods. With India making little effort to stem the avalanche of cheap Chinese goods flooding its market – despite Modi’s much-touted “Make in India” campaign – China’s status as the country’s largest source of imports appears secure.
China is well practiced in using trade and commercial penetration to bolster its influence in other countries. In India’s case, it is leveraging its clout as a major supplier of power and telecommunications equipment and active pharmaceutical ingredients, not to mention as a lender to financially troubled Indian firms, to limit the country’s options. By allowing the trade distortions from which China profits to persist – and, indeed, to grow – India is effectively funding this strategy.
As hard as Modi tries to put a positive spin on his recent visit to China, highlighting the 24 mostly symbolic agreements that were concluded, he cannot obscure the harsh strategic realities affecting the bilateral relationship. Without a new approach, the Sino-Indian relationship seems doomed to remain highly uneven and contentious.
作者:布拉马·切拉尼【印度】
