中国与印度两国的贸易关系是世界上最不平衡的贸易关系之一。中国向印度出口超过从印度进口价值的五倍。而且，中国主要从印度进口原材料，销售给印度的却主要是增值产品。
令人担忧的中印关系以充满怨恨的争端、深度不信任和双方对政治合作共有矛盾情绪为特征。蓬勃发展的双边贸易，伴随着日益增多的边界事件、军事紧张和地缘政治竞争以及在河流和海洋问题上的分歧，远未能助益两国翻过以往旧有裂痕的一页。
印度总理纳伦德拉·莫迪去年就职以来致力于改造印度与中国的关系，提出的理由是亚洲的发展前景“很大程度上”取决于中印加起来占世界人口三分之一的两个国家“各自取得的成就”和“合作共事”。但是，正如莫迪刚刚结束的中国之行所凸显的，导致这两个人口大国产生分歧的问题依然可怕。
诚然，中国领导人以时髦的方式盛情招待莫迪。莫迪抵达中国四大古都之一、习近平主席故乡的西安时，习近平亲自带领他游览大雁塔(莫迪随后便自夸他与习近平亲密的“加一”[Plus One]友谊)。在北京天坛外面李克强总理摆姿势与莫迪自拍。
中国领导人没有做的事情是在实质性问题上让步——而且不是因为莫迪没有做出努力。尽管莫迪采取务实与缓和的策略，请求中国就阻止两国伙伴关系“充分发挥潜力”的一些问题 “重新考虑处理方法”，但被中国忽视。
细想一下莫迪关于两国漫长的喜马拉雅山边界持续不断的争端的论述。莫迪只是顺便提及2006年以来中国一系列的军事入侵，宣称“不确定的阴影”笼罩着边界地区，因为中国在1962年战胜印度后单方面划定的“实际控制线”从未经过双方澄清(需要澄清的是，1962年10月20日，印军从中印边界东西两段向中国军队同时发动大规模进攻，中国军队被迫反击。在对印军进行必要的反击后，中国主动提出解决边界问题的积极建议，两国部队从中印双方之间的实际控制线，后撤20公里。在东段，中国边防部队撤回到实际控制线，即非法的“麦克马洪线”以北，并且从这条线再后撤20公里。在中段和西段，中国边防部队从实际控制线后撤20公里——译注)。莫迪建议双方重新启动澄清进程 ，但是完全没用。
事实上，经过20多年的谈判后，在2002年实际控制线持续模糊没有澄清，原因是中国违背与印度交换覆盖两大争议区域——位于喜马拉雅山两端面积相当于奥地利的阿鲁纳恰尔邦和面积相当于瑞士的阿克塞钦及其毗邻地区——地图的诺言。四年后，中国恢复其长期静默的对阿鲁纳恰尔邦主权要求，此后多次侵犯阿鲁纳恰尔邦边境。(事实是，中方从未承认非法的“麦克马洪线”和所谓的“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”，1972年，印度将该“东北边境特区”改为“阿鲁纳恰尔中央直辖区”。1987年2月，印度宣称建立“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”。中方多次严正声明，不承认非法的“麦线”和“阿邦”，并要求印度撤回所有越线设点的军事人员。——译注)今年二月中国严词谴责莫迪访问阿鲁纳恰尔邦。
尽管如此，莫迪热情构建中印双边关系，对其外交秘书攻其不备，宣布中国游客现在可以获得电子签证抵达印度。外交秘书刚刚还告诉媒体说没有达成这样的决定。中国外长欢呼莫迪此举为“礼物”，考虑到中国没有做任何让步作为回报，这实在是一个准确的描述。此外，中国还拒绝就出售跨界河流整年水文资料而不仅仅是雨季的水文资料达成协议。这样，中国不仅拒绝与其任何邻国达成水资源分享协议，而且甚至也不会分享上流河流的全面资料。
更糟的是，莫迪访问结束时发表的联合声明，语调明显纡尊降贵，中方“注意到”印度加入核供应国集团的“愿望”，“理解并支持印度在联合国包括安理会发挥更大作用的愿望”。中国是唯一没有支持印度成为联合国常任理事国的大国。
(莫迪访华的)经济成果也同样地不平等。莫迪在上海与商界领袖达成的可能价值220亿美元许多交易。中国国有银行将得以资助印度公司购买中国设备。这将恶化已经非常巨大的印度对华贸易赤字。同时也没有采取什么措施来推动中国在印度微薄的投资。
中印贸易关系是世界上最不平衡的贸易关系之一。中国对印出口超过从印度进口的价值高达五倍多。而且，中国主要从印度进口原材料，销售给印度的却主要是增值产品。
中国善于利用贸易与商业渗透支撑其在别国的影响力。就印度来说，中国借助于作为电力与电信设备和活性原料药主要供应商的影响力，更不必说作为陷入财务困境的印度公司的债权人，来限制印度的选项。
尽管莫迪竭力对其最近对中国的访问做正面倾向性解释，突显所达成的24项颇具象征性的协议，他也无法遮掩影响双边关系的严酷战略现实。如果没有新的方法，中印关系似乎注定依然将是非常不平坦、富有争议的。
作者简介：布拉马·切拉尼(Brahma Chellaney)，系新德里印度智库政策研究中心(Center for Policy Research)战略研究教授，拥有国际军备控制博士学位，著有《亚洲主宰：中国、印度和日本的崛起》(Asian Juggernaut：The Rise of China, India, and Japan)、《水：亚洲的新战场》(Water: Asia’s New Battleground ) 、《水、和平和战争：应对全球水危机》(Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis)等著作。《水：亚洲的新战场》一书2012年获得总部位于美国纽约的亚洲协会(Asia Society)颁发的“伯纳德·施瓦茨图书奖”(Bernard Schwartz Book Award)，使布拉马·切拉尼成为第一位生活于英语文化圈外的该奖获得者。布拉马·切拉尼在欧美学术界、大众传媒界和印度政界的影响力都不容小觑。
布拉马·切拉尼作为国际安全和军备控制专家，在美国哈佛大学、布鲁金斯学会、约翰·霍普金斯大学国际高级研究院和澳大利亚国立大学兼职，是负责颁发诺贝尔和平奖的挪威诺贝尔研究所(Norwegian Nobel Institute)研究员。
布拉马·切拉尼还担任电视评论员和世界报业辛迪加(Project Syndicate)专栏作家。世界报业辛迪加汇聚了世界顶级经济学家和学者的思考精华、观点和评论，为读者带来来自全球的原创的发人深省的经济、政治、科学和文化评论。他为美国《国际先驱论坛报》(International Herald Tribune)、《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal)、《日本时报》(The Japan Times)、 新加坡《海峡时报》(The Straits Times)、《印度时报》(The Times of India)、印度《经济时报》 (The Economic Times)和印度第二大财经报纸《铸币》( Mint)撰写评论文章。1985年获得美国海外新闻协会引用卓越奖(The Overseas Press Club of America's Citation for Excellence)。曾任印度国家安全委员会顾问至2000年1月，是印度国家安全咨询委员会外部安全小组(External Security Group of the National Security Advisory Board)召集人与核战略思想小组(Nuclear Doctrine Group)成员。
印度总理莫迪2015年5月16日结束访华，布拉马·切拉尼5月18日就在世界报业辛迪加网站发表《莫迪在中国》(Modi in China)一文，分析中印关系的战略现实。尼泊尔英文报纸《喜马拉雅时报》(Hymlayan Times)5月22日第8版以《莫迪访华：严酷的战略现实》(Modi’s China visit ：Harsh strategic realities)为题转发该文。
该文引发广泛关注，截至2015年5月23日该文已经被推特(Tweet)转发470人次，脸谱(Facebook)分享917次，领英(Linked in)分享64人次，谷歌书签(Goole Bookmarks )分享3人次。现将该文译为中文，供参考。——译者
河北经贸大学尼泊尔研究中心 张树彬 译
英语原文：
Modi in China
网址链接：
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/modi-china-visit-sino-indian-relationship-by-brahma-chellaney-2015-05
MAY 18, 2015
NEW DELHI – China and India have a fraught relationship, characterized by festering disputes, deep mistrust, and a shared ambivalence about political cooperation. Booming bilateral trade, far from helping to turn the page on old rifts, has been accompanied by increasing border incidents, military tensions, and geopolitical rivalry, as well as disagreements on riparian and maritime issues.
Since taking office last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sought to transform his country’s relationship with China, arguing that Asia’s prospects hinge “in large measure” on what the two countries – which together account for one-third of the world’s population – “achieve individually” and “do together.” But, as Modi’s just-concluded tour of China highlighted, the issues that divide the demographic titans remain formidable.
To be sure, China’s leaders fêted Modi in style. When Modi arrived in Xian – one of China’s four ancient capitals and President Xi Jinping’s hometown – Xi took him on a personal tour of the Big Wild Goose Pagoda. (Modi subsequently boasted of his close “plus one” friendship with Xi.) In Beijing, Premier Li Keqiang posed for a selfie with Modi outside the Temple of Heaven.
What China’s leaders did not do was yield on any substantive issue – and not for lack of effort on Modi’s part. Despite Modi’s pragmatic and conciliatory tack, his request that China “reconsider its approach” on some of the issues that are preventing the partnership from realizing its “full potential” went unheeded.
Consider discussions relating to the ongoing dispute over the two countries’ long Himalayan frontier. Alluding to a series of Chinese military incursions since 2006, Modi declared that “a shadow of uncertainty” hangs over the border region, because the “line of actual control” that China unilaterally drew after defeating India in a 1962 war that it had initiated was never mutually clarified. Modi proposed resuming the LAC clarification process, but to no avail.
In fact, the reason for the continued ambiguity is that, in 2002, after more than two decades of negotiations, China reneged on a promise to exchange maps with India covering the two main disputed sectors – the Austria-size Arunachal Pradesh and the Switzerland-size Aksai Chin, along with its adjacent areas – located at either end of the Himalayas. Four years later, China revived its long-dormant claim to Arunachal Pradesh, and has since breached its border several times. It fulminated against Modi’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh in February.
Nonetheless, in his zeal to build the bilateral relationship, Modi announced that Chinese tourists are now eligible to receive electronic visas on arrival in India – blindsiding his foreign secretary, who had just told the media that no such decision had been made. China’s foreign minister hailed the measure as a “gift” – an accurate description, given that China has yielded nothing in return. On the contrary, China has aimed to undermine India’s sovereignty, by issuing stapled visas to residents of Arunachal Pradesh.
Moreover, China – which, by annexing water-rich Tibet, has become the region’s hydro-hegemon – also declined to conclude an agreement to sell India hydrological data on transboundary rivers year-round, rather than just during the monsoon season. So China is not only refusing to create a water-sharing pact with any of its neighbors; it will not even share comprehensive data on upstream river flows.
Making matters worse, there is an unmistakable air of condescension in the pronouncements, contained in the joint statement issued at the end of Modi’s visit, that China “took note of India’s aspirations” to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and “understands and supports India’s aspiration to play a greater role in the United Nations, including in the Security Council.” China is the only major power that has not backed India’s bid to become a permanent member of the Security Council.
Economic outcomes were similarly unequal. Many of the deals Modi made with business leaders in Shanghai – supposedly worth $22 billion – entail Chinese state-owned banks financing Indian firms to purchase Chinese equipment. This will worsen India’s already massive trade deficit with China, while doing little to boost China’s meager investment in India, which totals just 1% of China’s annual bilateral trade surplus – a surplus that has swelled by one-third since Modi took office and is now approaching $50 billion.
Indeed, China and India have one of the world’s most lopsided trade relationships. Chinese exports to India are worth five times more than its imports from India. Moreover, China mainly purchases raw materials from India, while selling it mostly value-added goods. With India making little effort to stem the avalanche of cheap Chinese goods flooding its market – despite Modi’s much-touted “Make in India” campaign – China’s status as the country’s largest source of imports appears secure.
China is well practiced in using trade and commercial penetration to bolster its influence in other countries. In India’s case, it is leveraging its clout as a major supplier of power and telecommunications equipment and active pharmaceutical ingredients, not to mention as a lender to financially troubled Indian firms, to limit the country’s options. By allowing the trade distortions from which China profits to persist – and, indeed, to grow – India is effectively funding this strategy.
As hard as Modi tries to put a positive spin on his recent visit to China, highlighting the 24 mostly symbolic agreements that were concluded, he cannot obscure the harsh strategic realities affecting the bilateral relationship. Without a new approach, the Sino-Indian relationship seems doomed to remain highly uneven and contentious.
作者:布拉马·切拉尼【印度】
